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Backbench	rebels	are	likely	to	give	Merkel	a	headache
over	Europe
Greece	is	due	to	exit	its	current	bailout	programme	in	August	and	key	decisions	on	debt	relief	for	the
country	are	on	the	political	agenda	in	Brussels.	Caroline	Bhattacharya	explains	that	with	a	reduced
majority	and	potential	dissent	from	members	of	her	own	party	over	the	issue,	Angela	Merkel	could	face
a	challenging	time	in	the	Bundestag	over	the	coming	months.
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In	recent	weeks,	something	of	an	intra-party	rebellion	has	been	brewing	among	the	German	Christian	Democrats
over	Greece.	Backbenchers	in	the	Bundestag	could	yet	determine	the	future	of	both	Greece	and	the	Eurozone.
Future	Bundestag	debates	on	Greece’s	exit	from	the	bailout	programme,	debt	relief	for	Greece,	or	debt	mutualisation
as	part	of	wider	Eurozone	reforms,	are	expected	to	be	heated	and	the	government	majority	could	be	put	in	jeopardy.
The	last	general	election	in	Germany	was	followed	by	half	a	year	of	uncertainty	–	a	feeling	that	is	rare	in	German
politics.	In	the	end,	Merkel	got	what	she	wanted:	to	head	another	so-called	‘grand	coalition’	with	the	Social
Democrats	(SPD)	for	her	last	term	as	Chancellor.	However,	the	share	of	seats	held	by	Merkel’s	Christian	Democratic
Union	(CDU)	and	its	Bavarian	sister	party,	the	Christian	Social	Union	(CSU),	has	decreased	from	49	per	cent	to	35
per	cent.	More	strikingly,	government	MPs	now	hold	only	399	of	709	seats	(56	per	cent)	compared	to	504	of	631
seats	(80	per	cent)	in	the	previous	term.
Germany	is	characterised	by	high	levels	of	political	stability,	and	research	has	shown	that	voting	unity	has
traditionally	been	very	high	within	all	parties	in	the	Bundestag.	Thus,	a	narrow	government	majority	is	not	necessarily
an	issue	of	immediate	concern.	But	those	who	were	hoping	for	a	positive	response	from	Berlin	regarding	the	reform
proposals	for	the	European	Union	made	by	French	president	Emmanuel	Macron	should	be	particularly	worried	about
the	political	situation.
Although	the	coalition	agreement	contains	vague	commitments	to	increasing	the	EU	budget	and	reforming	the
Eurozone	while	adhering	to	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact,	it	is	necessary	to	have	realistic	expectations.	With	Martin
Schulz,	former	president	of	the	European	Parliament,	stepping	down	as	party	leader,	the	SPD	is	unlikely	to	prioritise
European	integration	and	push	for	substantial	reforms.	Without	any	pressure	from	the	Social	Democrats,	Merkel	has
no	reason	to	join	Macron	at	the	steering	wheel.	For	the	sake	of	peace	within	her	party,	she	will	be	happy	to	take	a
backseat,	and	could	yet	apply	the	brakes	to	Macron’s	reform	initiative.
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The	Greek	crisis	as	a	test	of	party	unity
One	lesson	from	the	last	few	years	has	been	that	party	unity	can	be	a	fragile	thing	when	transnational	issues	come
to	shape	the	domestic	political	agenda.	The	Greek	sovereign	debt	crisis	was	a	clear	demonstration	of	this,	with	the
crisis	creating	new	lines	of	division	within	established	mainstream	parties.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	conservative
parties	with	a	centrist	position	on	European	integration	are	particularly	susceptible	to	internal	dissent,	since	they
support	economic	integration	while	simultaneously	defending	national	sovereignty	against	further	political	integration
and	the	nation	state	against	the	socio-cultural	effects	of	transnationalism.	This	tension	is	undoubtedly	present	in	the
German	Christian	Democrats.
Between	2010	and	2015,	the	Bundestag	passed	twelve	acts	related	to	measures	for	resolving	the	Eurozone	crisis,
and	five	of	those	votes	concerned	aid	packages	for	Greece.	As	illustrated	in	Figure	1,	over	the	course	of	the	crisis,
voting	unity	dropped	to	levels	well	below	average	for	all	parties	at	some	stage.	This	disintegration	of	the	pro-
European	consensus	reached	a	high	watermark	in	2015,	when	the	second	aid	package	for	Greece	was	extended
and	the	third	package	was	negotiated	and	passed.	While	the	Social	Democrats	became	more	united	after	joining	the
government	in	October	2013,	intra-party	dissent	among	the	Christian	Democrats	grew	with	each	vote	regarding
Greece.	In	August	2015,	more	than	one	in	five	CDU/CSU	delegates	diverged	from	the	party	line	by	not	supporting
the	third	aid	package.	This	is	contrary	to	the	general	tendencies	in	the	Bundestag,	as	we	would	expect	voting	unity	to
be	highest	in	the	CDU	and	CSU.
Figure	1:	Agreement	index	for	roll-call	votes	on	Eurozone	crisis	measures	compared	to	average	levels
during	the	2005–2009	term	(click	to	enlarge)
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Note:	Agreement	index	is	based	on	Hix	et	al.	2003	and	average	levels	for	party	groups	are	derived	from	the	work	of	Bergmann	et
al.	(2016)
Three	parliamentary	channels	of	communication
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The	Bundestag	provides	three	significant	channels	of	public	expression	for	MPs	who	want	to	get	their	voices	heard:
giving	a	speech	in	the	plenary,	voting	(in	a	roll-call	vote),	and	delivering	an	‘explanation	of	vote’,	which	are	used	to
provide	justification	for	a	voting	decision	or	to	voice	reservations.
The	level	of	disagreement	with	the	party	leadership	determines	which	action	an	MP	chooses:	defecting	in	a	whipped
vote	is	the	most	radical	display	of	defiance	(besides	leaving	the	party),	whereas,	in	theory,	speeches	offer	an	outlet
for	lesser	disagreement.	In	the	Bundestag,	however,	party	leaders	decide	who	gets	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	party
and	for	how	long.	Previous	research	has	shown	that	in	highly	salient	debates,	German	party	leaders	are	more	likely
to	speak	themselves	and	MPs	who	are	ideologically	distant	from	the	leadership	tend	to	give	fewer	speeches
(whereas	the	opposite	is	the	case	in	the	UK	House	of	Commons).
Joint	research	with	my	colleague	Achillefs	Papageorgiou	confirms	that	the	debates	on	the	Greek	crisis	were
dominated	by	a	small	number	of	party	leaders	and	other	experienced	frontbenchers	sticking	to	the	party	line.	Hence,
the	plenary	debates	did	not	reflect	the	growing	controversy	over	the	issue	and	the	disintegration	of	the	pro-European
consensus	within	–	rather	than	between	–	legislative	parties.	From	the	patterns	of	voting	behaviour,	we	observe	that
rank	and	experience	are	significant	predictors	for	defection,	and	in	line	with	earlier	research,	their	combined	effect	is
even	stronger:	Experienced	MPs	who	sit	on	the	backbenches,	either	because	they	have	been	demoted	or	never	held
office	in	the	first	place,	are	the	most	likely	to	defect.	Among	the	Christian	Democrats,	we	also	see	that	the	vast
majority	of	dissidents	(64	out	of	66)	are	MPs	who	have	been	elected	from	single-member	districts	(as	opposed	to
closed	party	lists).
We	also	examine	the	usage	of	‘explanations	of	votes’	and	find	that,	despite	their	limited	public	visibility,	they	provide
a	worthwhile	channel	of	communication	for	rank-and-file	MPs,	newcomers	and	list	MPs.	Also,	women	MPs,	who	are
underrepresented	in	‘hard’	policy	debates	like	this	one,	are	more	inclined	to	explain	their	voting	decision	than	their
male	colleagues.	These	groups	of	legislators	may	lack	access	to	the	plenary	floor,	find	the	threshold	of	defection	too
high	and/or	have	more	to	lose,	as,	for	example,	list	MPs	are	more	dependent	on	their	party	leadership	for	re-election.
Most	interestingly,	we	reveal	some	sequential	dynamics	between	legislative	activities:	an	MP	who	defected	in	one
vote	is	much	more	likely	(11	times)	to	cast	a	deviant	vote	the	next	time,	whereas	MPs	are	less	likely	to	explain	their
voting	decision	if	they	have	done	so	in	the	previous	debate.	An	MP	who	delivered	an	‘explanation	of	vote’	in	the	past
does	not	appear	to	have	a	strong	motivation	to	invest	limited	resources	to	explain	his/her	decision	again	if	their
opinion	on	the	issue	has	remained	unchanged.	What	is	even	more	intriguing,	an	MP	who	has	explained	their	voting
decision	is	two	times	more	likely	to	vote	against	the	party	line	in	a	future	vote.	In	other	words,	‘explanations	of	votes’
are	a	first	step	towards	defection	and	can	function	as	a	‘warning’	mechanism	for	party	leaderships.
What	is	next?
Over	the	years,	Greece’s	creditors	have	promised	to	lighten	the	country’s	debt	load	(e.g.	by	further	extending	the
repayment	periods	or	cutting	the	interest	rates)	on	condition	of	reform	efforts.	As	a	result	of	drastic	austerity
measures	and	tax	increases,	Greece	has	been	running	a	primary	budget	surplus	for	two	consecutive	years.	In
August	2018,	the	third	bailout	programme	will	end,	and	it	is	time	for	the	Eurozone	countries	and	the	International
Monetary	Fund	to	keep	up	their	promises.
In	the	past,	Germany	has	opposed	substantive	debt	relief	and	only	reluctantly	agreed	to	extending	repayment
periods	and	lowering	the	interest	rates.	Although	the	new	finance	minister,	Olaf	Scholz,	a	Social	Democrat,	is
believed	to	be	more	flexible	than	his	predecessor,	Christian	Democrat	Wolfgang	Schäuble,	the	domestic	hostility	to
debt	relief	and	fear	of	a	‘transfer	union’	has	certainly	not	decreased	–	quite	the	opposite.	As	the	Eurogroup	continues
talks	on	whether	Greece	will	need	debt	relief	after	exiting	the	bailout	programme	and	whether	this	potential	debt	relief
includes	a	‘growth	adjustment	mechanism’	that	links	repayments	to	Greece’s	economic	growth	rate,	it	is	unclear	how
Merkel	can	convince	her	conservative	backbenchers.
We	also	need	to	remember	that	the	Alternative	for	Germany	(AfD),	now	most	known	for	their	anti-immigration
agenda,	started	out	as	a	single-issue	party	campaigning	for	Germany‘s	exit	from	the	common	currency.	The	Free
Democrats,	who	are	in	favour	of	Greece’s	exit	from	the	Eurozone,	have	also	re-entered	the	Bundestag.	Hence,	inter-
party	competition	on	the	Greek	question	and	other	EU	issues	will	intensify.	The	CDU/CSU	will	have	to	close	ranks
again	and	tighten	the	thumbscrews	on	dissenters	to	toe	the	party	line.
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What	does	this	mean	for	future	votes?	Let	us	do	the	maths:	46	out	of	the	66	dissenters	from	2015	are	still	in	the
Bundestag.	(14	of	the	remaining	MPs	retired	and	six	were	not	re-elected.)	If	they	were	all	to	adhere	to	their	previous
stance	and	oppose	further	financial	support	for	Greece	or	concessions,	for	instance,	in	the	form	of	a	‘haircut’	(i.e.	a
debt	write-off),	the	government	majority	would	shrink	to	only	one	seat.
The	government	majority	could	even	be	put	in	jeopardy,	as	two	Social	Democrats	who	defected	in	2015	have	been
re-elected,	and	ten	more	MPs	from	the	governing	coalition	issued	an	individual	‘explanation	of	vote’	in	the	last	vote
on	Greece,	an	indication	for	potential	defection	in	the	future.	Our	research	suggests	that	once	an	MP	has	crossed
the	threshold	of	defection	accepting	potential	sanctions,	they	are	highly	likely	to	defect	in	a	future	vote,	especially
since	the	issue	has	become	increasingly	controversial	(with	public	opinion	largely	against	support	for	Greece),	while
the	government’s	official	position	has	remained	unaltered.
Although	the	majority	could	potentially	be	saved	by	the	Greens,	the	question	remains	whether	the	prospect	of	a
public	embarrassment	of	the	Chancellor	and	the	Finance	Minister	would	be	enough	for	party	rebels	to	change	their
voting	behaviour.	What	other	incentive	would	they	have?	As	they	have	defected	in	the	past,	they	have	either	already
faced	sanctions	or	did	not	experience	any	negative	consequences	for	their	disloyalty.	In	fact,	the	majority	of	them
outperformed	their	party	in	the	elections.	On	average,	they	received	0.64	per	cent	more	votes	compared	to	all
Christian	Democratic	candidates	collectively	in	their	respective	federal	state.	(In	the	2013	elections,	the	much	smaller
group	of	13	dissenters	outperformed	the	party	by	0.8	per	cent	on	average.)
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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